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Transparency and Performance of Malaysian Companies

Che Haat, Mohd. H., R. Rahman, and S. Mahenthiran

Abstract
The paper aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance practices on corporate
transparency and performance of Malaysian listed companies.

I

Introduction
The Asian financial crisis that started in 1997, partly originated from the prolonged
recession in Japan in the early 1990s (Sachs, 1998), which adversely affected the
performance of many East Asian economies, including Malaysia. It is generally
believed that a lack of sound corporate governance was to a certain extent, a major
(Jvlohammed et of,
reason for this economic crisis in the East Asian region (Mohammed
al, 2006;
D'Cruz, 1999; Khas, 2002). Also, the downfall of worldwide corporate giants such as
Enron, Xerox, Worldcom and Parmalat (to name a few) have left deep scars on the
failures including
corporate world in general. It has been shown that most corporate faililles
L"orporate governance. The US
Enron and Worldcom, can be caused by the lack of good c"orporate
effeL1 poor
accounting scandals hastened the understanding of the wide-ranging effect
efieL1s on
corporate governance can have on a country's economy, through the effecls
the c..1pital
G..1pital markets. Such incidents have adversely affected public confidence in the
reliability of corporate reporting.
reporting. In Malaysia, the scandals in the USA, as well as the
mm;idered ;1.';
1997-1998 financial crisE'.'>, have been mnsidered
3.'; a wake-up call to the need for better
transparenL)T among Malaysian companies. The Malaysian
corporate governance and transparenc)'
blemi.<.;hed by a couple of cases of bad corporate
corporate landscape has been blemi..:.;hed
(Jv1AS).
governance such as Renong, Perwaja Steel and Malaysia Airlines System (rvlAS).
Poor corporate governance, weak investor relations, a low level of transparency in
disclosing information by companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia (BMB) or formerly
known as the Kuala Lumpur
LumPill Stock Exchange (KLSE),
(KL.SE), and the ineffectiveness of
regulatory agencies in enforcing legislation in punishing offenders and protecting
attributing to the collapse of
minority shareholders, are all partly blamed as reasons atuibuting
several Malaysian companies (Mohamad, 2(02). These problem..s
problems have drawn attention
transparency and
to the need to maintain corporate governance standards, increase transparenc)'
improve investor relations, while the market regulatory agencies such as the Securities
Commission (SC) and BMB should press for more effective enforcement of legislation.
A survey of the investment community
mmmunity and financial intermediaries
intennediaries in Malaysia,
conduL1ed by The Edge and Bulletin International, a UK-based public relations and
conducled
problem..". The
image management consultant, revealed clear evidence of such problem'>.
transparenL)T, improved corporate governance
respondents indicated that increasing transparenc)',
c.:'1pital inflovl into the country
and better investor relations helped to increase C:'1pital
(The Edge, 8 June 1998).
According to Graham et ai. (2002), the cost of poor corporate governance is borne
heavily by minority shareholders, which is the case in emerging markets like Malaysia
where many public companies are family owned. One of the ways to improve investor
confidence is to have good governance practices that may contribute to better financial
disclosilles and more transparent business reporting. According to Frost et of
al (2002),
disclosures
discitlsilles
improvements in corporate governance praL1ices
praclices that contribute to better disclosures
in business reporting in-turn can facilitate greater market liquidity and capital
formation in emerging markets. As SUCh,
such, corporate governance is of critical importance
to investors, insurers, regulators, creditors, customers, employees and other
stakeholders. However, several questions need to be answered: are Malaysian
transparency? Is good corporate
companies concerned about corporate governance and transparenc)'?
governance a prerequisite to good business and market performance?
IRk!
Le-e (2003) cites a finding disclosed by KPMG and The Edge (a leading weekly
business report published in Malaysia) where only 75 companies among more than 800
companies listed on BMB (which is less than 10 per cent as of 31 December 2002)
provided a positive economic return, therefore creating value to the shareholders, while
a1 (2004), who are of the
the rest instead destroyed value. This is supported by Chen et 01
opinion that in emerging markets, majority shareholders who are closely associated
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with corporate insiders ac't as if minority investors capital has no opportunity cost.
Hence, they do not feel obliged to provide a return to the shareholders.
Recognising the importance of corporate governance and disclosure adequacy, it is
vital to have a study focusing on developing a framework and benchmarking corporate
governance practiCE's (imong Malaysian companies. I--Ience, this study atl.empts to find
out whether good corporate governance practices have a positive relationship with the
timeliness of reporting, level of disclosure as well as company's performance. The
findings of this study are important to rel:,TUlators, investors, academics and others who
contend that good corporate governance is important for increasing investor
confidence and market liquidity (Donaldson, 2003). With the regulations focusing on
corporate governance introduced by the Malaysian authorities (as part of
their corporate governance reform agenda), such as the Report of Finance
Committee on Corporate ('rlwernance, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance
and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, there is a widely held view that better
corporate govemance is associated with better finn performance. However, the
evidence is tenuous (LeBlanc and Gillies, 2003).
The results of our study of 73 good performance companies and 73 bad performance
companies found that corporate governance fac'tors have a strong predicting power on
company performance, mainly due to debt monitoring and foreign ownership.
However. then~ is a significant negative relation behveen audit quality and
pfdonnance. The results fine! that perJom:ance is not associated with the level of
disclosure and timely reporting. The results indicate that disclosure and timeliness are
not significant contributing factors in the relationship bet\veen corporate governance
and market performance.
The remainder of this paper is struc'tured as follows. In the next sec'tion, we review
the literature on internal governance, ownership stnlCture and financing factors as \vell
as audit quality. The following section provides a discussion on hypothesis
development which involves the relationship between corporate govemance and
performance, as well as between corporate governance and transparency. The third
section e:ll.'"j)lains the methodology used to satisfy the objectives of study. The fourth
section reports the results of the study, leading to a conclusion, implications and
limitations of the study.

Literature review
Internal governance
The board of directors is an important component of internal governance that enables
the ~"olving of agency problems inherent in managing any organisations. The board
ha.s the pc)\ver to hire, (ire ~md compensate the top-level decision managfrs and to ratify
and monitor vital decisions. Board of directors are widely recognised as an important
mechanism for monitoring the performance of managers and protec'ting shareholders'
interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The Malaysian Code on Corporate ('rlwernance
(MCCG) (Finance Olmmittee on Corporate Governance, 2(01) also recogni..-;es that good
corporate governance rests firmly with the entire board of directors and as such, they
should take the lead role in establishing best practice.
With regard to the independence of board of directors, it is argued by both agency
theory and resource dependence theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Pearce and Zahra,
1992) that the larger the number of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board, the
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better they <:.:1.n fulfil their role in monitoring and controlling the actions of the executive
directors (ED), as well as providing a window to the outside world. The premise of
agency theory is that NEDs are needed on the boards to monitor and control the actions
of ED due to their opportunistic behaviour Gensen and Meckling, 1976). Mangel and
Singh (1993) opine that NEDs have more opportunity for control and face a complex
web of incentives, stemming directly from their responsibilities as directors and
augmented by their equity position. Hence, NEDs are considered as the check and
balance mechanism in enhancing the board's effectiveness. In addition, those who
share a similar opinion include Fama and Jensen (1983) who argue that outside
directors might be considered to be "decision experts"; Weisbach (1988) notes that
NEDs should be independent and not intimidated by the CEO; able to reduce
managerial consumption of perquisites (Brickley and James, 1987) and they can act as
a positive influence over directors' deliberations and decisions (pearce and Zahra,

1992).
Empirical evidence on the a§ociation between outside independent directors and
finll perfom1ance is mixed. Studies have found that having more outside independent
directors on the board improves performance (Daily and Dalton, 1994), while other
studies have not found a link between independent NEDs and improved firm
performance (Hennalin and Weisbach, 1991). The point that can be made from these
studies is that there is no dear benefit to firm performance provided by independent
I\'EDs. Petra (2005) argues that the mixed results may be reflective of a corporate
<.:ulture wherein corporate boards are controlled by management and the presence of
independent NEDs has no discernable impact on management decisions.
However, other empirical evidence does suggest that independent NEDs do play the
important role of being a shareholder advocate. For example, studies have shown that
shareholders benefit more when independent NEDs have control of the board in tender
offers for bidders (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) and in hostile take-over threat."> (Gibbs,
1993). Furthermore, Beasley (1996) reports that an investigation commissioned by the
Tread\vay Commission into the govemance structures of failed fim1s indicates that the
boards of diret,lors were dominated by management and "grey" directors (i.e. outsiders
with special tie."> to the t,,(lmpany or management). Beasley (1996) found that
independent NEDs reduce the likelihood of financial statement fraud. These studies
indicate that independent NEDs do monitor and control management and this could
lead to better company performance.
Another aspet,l of corporate governance that has become a concern nowadays i." the
"dominant personality" phenomenon (Forker, 1992). The i§ue revolves around role
duality, that is, when the CEO is also the Chairman of the board. There are two views in
this issue. Firstly, the proponents of agency theory argue for a separation of the two
roles to provide essential check and balances over management's performance
(Argenti, 1976; Stiles and Taylor, 1993; Blackburn, 1994). On the other hand, the
alternative argument based upon stewardship theory is that the separation of roles is
not vital, since many companies are well run with combined role." and have strong
boards fully capable of providing adequate checks. In addition, when the role is
combined, the CEO may be able to shape the company to achieve stated objet,lives due
to less interference. Those who advocate role duality are Ei..<;enhardt (1989), Dahya et a1
(1996), Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Rechner and Dalton (1991). The basis of their
arguments is stewardship theory, which suggests that managers at,l in the best
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interests of the finns and shareholders, and that role duality enh.:mces the effectiveness
of boards.
As for the as.."ociation between role duality and performance, Abdul Ralunan and
Haniffa (2003) documented that Malaysian companies with role duality seem not to
perform as well as their counterparts with separate board leadershjp based on
accounting performance measurement. Dahya et oJ. (1996) also concluded that the
market responds favourably to the separation of the roles and that the accounting
per(onnance of firms with role duality appears to decline. In other words, a separation
of the role of the Chairman and CEO will help enhance monitoring quality and reduce
the advantages gained by withholding information, and therefore the quality and
timeliness of reporting will improve. In looking at the Malaysian context, role duality is
not particularly common among listed companies although the potential impact on
disclosure and timeliness and ultimately the effect on performance is considered
worthy of testing (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).
Another important aspect of corporate governance is about the issue of direl'tors
(regardless of executive or non-executive) who may sit on more than one board
(cross-directorships). Dahya et aL (1996) suggest that cross-directorships will help in
making information more transparent as comparisons can be made based on
knowledge of other organisations. Hence, decisions made at one board may become
part of the information for decisions at other boards. In adilition, the interlocking of
CEOs is desirable because of their experience and credibility as peers. This has been
emphasised by Lorsch and Maciver (1989, p. 27) who assert that "serving on board is a
way to see how somebody else is doing the same thing". In other words, CEOs join
other boards and thereby create interlocking relationships specifically to "embed" what
they are doing (Davis, 1996).
High management ownership where managers obtain effective control of thefiml
will be negatively related to firm value because of managemen t entrenchment (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1989). These authors argue tha t managers entrench them.selves by making
manager-specific investments that make it costly for sh.:1reholders to repl1.ce them.
According to Wright (1996), the pos.."ible reason is because managers with high levels
of stock ownership, the potential for undiversified personal we..1.lth portfolios, and the
potential for entrenchment may elicit management decisions inconsistent with a
growth-oriented, risk-taking objective of enhancing shareholder value.
Studies invesl:igatil1g the relationsh ip between finn performance anel managerial
stock ownership have come up with mixed evidence (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;
McOll1nell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). In the USA, studies show
that the effect of insider ownership to company performance is dependent upon the
percentage of ownership. For example, Morck et aL (1988) find a positive relationship
when the ownership is below 5 per cent, but shows a negative relationship when the
range of ownership is between 5 and 25 per cent. Hiraki et aL. (2003) also provide
evidence in their study on Japanese fim1s that insider O\'inership is positively related to
fim1 value and expropriation of finn resources to the detelminant of minority
shareholders.
The empirical ambiguity of the relationship is often cited as evidence of a complex
role of insider ownership. This is because while it aligns the interests of managers and
shareholders and thus enhances performance, it also facilitates managerial
entrenchment and adversely affel'ts performance. Himmelberg et al (1999) find no
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meaningful correlation between marulgerial ownership and performance. However,
Khanna et al. (2005) provide evidence that the relationship is not spurious as argued by
Himmelberg et al. (1999) and there is strong evidence that insider ownership
signiflGI.nt:1y impacts J1nn value.
La Porta et al. (2000) defines corporate governance as a SFt: of mechanisms through
which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by corporate
insiders. The degree of expropriation by insiders depends on the inve.."ltrnent
opportunities available and the cost of e>'-lJropriation to the finn. Johnson et al. (2000)
and Durnev and Kim (2003) suggest that insiders expropriate more when the market is
bad, and take less when the market is good These authors argue that one could
addres.'l the agency problem between outsiders and corporate insiders by imposing a
higher cost on ex-propriation by using grm-vth opportunities, exiernal financing and
concentrated ownership. In short, high insider ownership is normally associated with
management entrenchment and expropriation of firm rl'_'>ources.

OwnerslujJ strUl:ture!financ£ng fm:tors
Shareholders can exercise their influence over the govemance of individml
corporations both formally, through the proxy system where they can initiate and
vote on proposals, and informally, through negotiations with corporate management
(Davis and Thompson, 1994). Researchers consider foreign ownership and debt
monitoring as part of cor])orate governance because of the influence that they can exert
on company's marulgement
Foreign ownership is expected to be one of the ways of technologically upgrading
fim1s in developing countries. via clirect irnPOlt of new capital and new tt'chnologies
(Benfratello and Sembenell~ 2002; Kozlov et al., 2000). Another important contribution
of foreign investment in transition as well as developing economies is potential
spin-offs of western marulgerial techniques (Kozlov et al., 2000). In addition,
foreign-owned films increase competition in the market, thus forcing domestic firms to
restructure faster. Restructuring can take the form of technological improvements and
improvement in corporate governance, and changes in the range and quality of goods
produced.
Kozlov et al (2000) indicate that foreign firms v..-ere fOlmd to be more productive
than the domestic ones. A number of studies address the relation between performance
and the presence of foreign owners. Makhija and Spiro (2000) examine the share prices
of 988 newly privatisecl C7.£ch fimls and f'mel that share prices are positively correlated
with foreign ownership. Similarly, Boubakri et ai. (2003), in a study of 189 sampled
finDS in 32 developing countries found that profitability and efficiency gains are
associated with the presence of foreign owners. This is also supported by Anderson
et al's (1997) study on Czech privatised companies. Similar results are reported by
Hingorani et al. (1997), who conclude that insider and foreign ownership mitigate
agency problems through incentives that align the interests of managers and investors.
In Malaysia, there has been no empirical evidence published with respect to the
direct impact of foreign ownership and corporate governance practices. However, it is
expel1ed that foreign ownership has an indirect impal1 on corporate governance, due
to the presence of foreign-owned firms that will increase competition in the market, and
therefore exerting pressure on local firms into having good corporate governance at
least at par with foreignowned finns. It is hoped thal the presence of foreign
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ownership as an aspect of governance mechanism would be able to enhance firm
performance.
In relation to debt financing, Buslunan et aL(2004) found that board struLlure and
high ownership are not independent, and that these governance variables are related to
earnings timeline..">s and organizational complexity. Their study shows that limited
transparency and complexity of firms' operations are c..'luses of high insider ownership
concentration. To overcome the agency costs of high ownership concentration levels,
managers and insiders can show their willingness to be monitored by creditors such as
banks by increasing their public borrowing (Harvey et ai., 2003; Diamond, 1991).
Harvey et al. (2003) found that in emerging markets where extreme information
asymmetry exists between corporate insiders and outsiders, the company uses debt
borrowed in international markets to signal their willingness to be monitored by debt
holders. However, following the Asian crisis, Malaysia prohibited currency trading
and raising debt in developed markets and thus the opportunity to reduce agency costs
between insiders and outsiders by this means is also unavailable. Therefore,
domestically issued short-term debt will not discourage corporate insiders from using
it to further their own entrenched interests, which will only attenuate the agency
problems between insiders and outside equity shareholders.
According to SarkaI' and Sarkar (2005), excess cash flows in a fmn will give
opportunities for self-interested managers to take on projeLls with negative NPV and
such an "overinvestments" problem reduces the market value of the fim: and impacts
shareholder value adversely. Hence, given the high agency costs of insider ownership
and the need for capitaL the poor performance L'ompanies would rely on a larger
amount of debt financing than the rest.

Audit quality
Audit is an important element of efticient equity markets, because audits can enhance
the credibility oj' financial inionnatiol1. directly SUppOlt better C0l1JOrate govemance
practices tlu-ough transparent financial repOliing (Francis et al., 2003; Sloan, 2(01) and
therefore ultimately influences the allocation of re-sources (SEC, 20(0). Theoretically, a
large public accounting finn with greater investment in reputational capital has more
reason to minimise audit errors via "auditor-reputation effects" (DeAngelo, 1981;
Beatty, 1989). In addition, Dye (1993) argues that brge auc]jt firms are inclined to
supply a higher quality audit compared to small finns, as more wealth is at stake in
hrgc audit finns. They will also experience a greater loss through reputation damage if
the quality of their audit does not meet the accepted quality standards.
DeFond and jiambalvo's study (1993) indicated that large audit finns are more
independent of management. They found that the (then) Big Eight audit finns
experienced a greater number of disagreements with former clients than non-Big Eight
fim's. Therefore, empirical evidence seems to support the differential audit quality
based on the lype of audit fmn. There are a number of empirical studies supporting the
positive relationship between audit quality and audit finn size (palrnrose, 19M, 1986;
Francis and Simon, 1987; jang-Yong jonathan and Lin, 1993; Hogan and jeter, 1997). In
addition, as argued by Mitton (2002), that as quality audit 1.<; also one aspect of
corporate govemance, it is expected that 11m,s which are audited by one of Big Four
audit 11m,s (a proxy for audit quality) will have a better market perfom,ance as well as
greater transparency.
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Hypotheses development
Cor/JOral.e governance and /Jer!ormance
Corporate governance mechanisms assure investors in corporations that they will
receive adequate returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). If these
mechanisms did not exist or did not function properly, outside investors would not
lend to Jirn1s or buy their equity securities. Overall, economic perfonnance would likely
suffer because many good business opportunities would be missed and temporary
financial problems at individual finns would spread quickly to other finns, employees
and consumers. Previous evidence suggests that corporate governance has a positive
influenc.t' over corporate pe.rformance. For example, based on industry-level view,
Rajan and Zinga]es (J998) find that fimls in industries that require large amounts of
extemal financing grO\v faster in countries with high scores on their measures of
financial development. Thus, corporate governance (measured through better
accounting standards, stronger legal protection of investors, and a stronger rule of
law) appears to matter for corporate perfonnance. In addition, Liang Li (1999),
Williams (2000), Alves and Mendes (2002), Drobetz el at. (2003) and Gemmill and
Thomas (2004) concluded in their respective studie..-; that there is a positive relationship
between gooclc'O!1Jorate governance practices and fiml value.
The above discussion provides a basis to support the argument that there is a
positive relationship between good corporate govemance practices and firrr.
performance. This is consistent with the agency theory, where better
firn1 perfom1ance is achieved clue to the fact tl1at good governance practices provide
better monitoring and better proteLlion to shareholders. The discussion above leads to
the hypothesis:
Hi.

Other things being equal, stronger internal governance mechanisms lead to
significant higher tim: perfoffilance.

H2.

Other things being equal, higher foreign o'wnership and higher debt financing
lead to significant bjgher finn perfOlTIlanCe_

H3.

Other things being equal, higher audit quality leads to s~gnificant higher firm
perfonnance.

Cor/JOral.e governance and lrrms/Jare-ncy
Empirical evidence suggests that improved disclosure has a material impaC1 on the
cost of capital. Greater disclosure and timely reporting is said to reduce the cost of
equity through lower transaction costs, reduced error in earnings forecasts, or
higher demand for a company's securities (Euromoney Institutional Investor, 2001).
Another commonly cited benefit of greater corporate disclosure is that by
mitigating information asymmetry, it reduces the magnitude of periodic surprises
about a finn's perlorn1ance and makes its stock price less volatile (Lang and
Lundholm, 1999).
As SUCh, strengthened corporate governance and reporting pral1ices, and the
improved tTedibiliiy of financial infonnation thai \vould result, may not eliminate
business failure in totality, but could provide the "red flag" signal to the stakeholders
especially to the regulators. Hence, in line with past studies, the level of transparency
(through better disclosure and timely reporting) is considered a re..-;ult of good
governance prac1ice..-; which in turn can help to reduce infonnation asyrrunetry between
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outsider:;; and corporate insiders, and between institutional shareholder:;; and minority
shareholders. This leads to the next hypotheses which state:
H4.

Other things being equal, stronger internal governance mechanisms lead to
significant higher level of corporate transparency.

Hfi.

Other things being equal, higher foreign ov-rnership anel h~gher debt financing
lead lo signiflcant higher levf1 of c0l1lorale t.ransparency.

H6.

Other thjngs being equal higher audit quality leads to significant higher
corporate transparency.

RelationsmjJ between wr/Jorate governance, trans/Jarency and /Jer!onnance
Corporate governance may have an influence on the level of disclosure (Haniffa and
Cooke, 2(02) as well as timeliness of reporting, especially as it is the board of
directors that manages information disclosure in annual reports (Gibbins et aL,
1990). The quantity of information and especially voluntary items disclosed in the
annual reports and the time the infommtion to be released, are influenced by the
board of director:;;. Thus, referring back to agency theory, when the board of
dim..1:ors are independent of the management and observe their responsibility to be
accountable and transparent to the shareholders or stakeholders, they will disclose
on time all the relevant information, not just the mandatory ones but also the
voluntary items.
In view of the importance of the disclosure factor (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) as well
as timely reporting (Oh, 2(03) in relation to corporate governance in Malaysia, this
study attempts to test whether corporate governance practices can predict the level of
transparency (more specifically the level disclosure and timeliness of reporting). Then,
in tum, higher level of transparency may be able to positively affect firm performance
based on the premise that improved disclosure as well as timely reporting may reduce
cost of capital and mitigate information asymmetry as argued by Euromoney
Institutional Investor (2001) and Lang and Lundholm (1999).
As for the relation between transparency and performance, with increased
voluntary disclosure and more timely reporting (therefore greater transparency) Loh
(2002) found that finns may gain numerous beneflts, including a better managed
company, increased management credibility, more long-term investors, greater
analyst following, improved access to C2pital and lower cost of C2pital, and the
realisation of a company's true underlying value. Hence, based on this argument, it is
expected that flnns with a higher level of disclosure and greater timelinp~'-;S in
reporting will gain better market performance. This leads to the following
hypotheses:

H7a, Strong corporate governance mechanisms lead to increased transparency.
H7b. InC-Teased transparency leads to significant higher tim: performance.
Research methodology
Sam/JIe seJ.ecti(m
The sample covers 868 companies listed on BMB (formerly known as the KL.')E) as at
31 December 2002. Seventy·tive of these companies filel the selection criteria by the
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KPMG/The Edge ranking of the top 75 listed companies by shareholder value creation
(The Edge, 18 August 2(03). However, only the data of 73 of them were u..<:;eable since
there is incomplete data for two companies. The 73 companies were used as the
benchmark for companies with good performance similar to argumen~ made by Peters
and Waterman (1982) and Lee (2003). The emphasis on shareholder value creation in
this study is based on the premise that accounting performance measures are not
necessarily consistent with shareholder value performance (Peters and Waterman,
1982). Therefore, films \vhich shmv good accounting perfonnance do not necessarily
create bener value for shareholders.
In order to compare like with like, the same number of control companies as those of
the respective companie..<:; set matched by size (total assets) and sec10r on one-tn-one
basis were selected from the remaining listed companies. This is similar to the selec1ion
method in Abdul Rahman and Limmack's (2005) study on corporate acquisitions of
Malaysian listed companies. In order tn selec1 73 companies that will match the good
performance group, the total as.<:;et figures (from year 2002 annual reports) for all
companies listed on BMB were collected. Then, for each industrial sec10r,
the companies were ranked according to their total asset figures. The most
(mnpara ble company to the good performance b'TOUP company is identified according
to the neaTest total asset figure in each sector. To identify (mupany performance,
Tobin's Q is calculated for each film. To take into account the effect of different
industries which the companies belong to, industry-adjusted Q is calculated tn
represent the rela.tive perfomlaTlce. Out. of the tota 1 146 sample finns, four were
eliminated as they were considered as outliers, because the Q value of the two of them
were extremely high (above 1(0), while the remainder recorded negative Q.
Consequently, the number of usable sample companies was further reduced from 146
to 142.

Data colJ.cr:tilm
The data collected for this study comprises two categories: dependent and independent
variables. The dependent variable is represented by Tobin's Q. However, in other
regression analysis, transparency (which consist of two components: timeliness of
reporting and corporate governance disclosure) is also regressed as a dependent
variable. Independent variables consist of seven corporate governance characteristics,
viz. board independence, board leadership or role duality, quality of directors, insider
ownership, foreign oVvllership, debt financing and audit quality. Table I provides the
descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables selected in this
study, as well as their sources of infonnation. Data on total assets, shareholder equity,
number of ordinary shares, total debts and total liabilities are obtained from company's
annual report. Share price for each company is obtained from the Daily Diary record
provided by BMB in its Public Information Centre. Corporate governance variables are
obtained from companies' annual reports at the then KLSE for the fisca'! year ending
2002. The year 2002 is chosen for the purpose of observing the effec1 of new Revamped
KL')E Listing Requirements on corporate governance which were introduced in 2001.
The new listing requirements require all listed companies to include in their annual
reports a separate statement on corporate governance.
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Table I.
Operationalisation of the
independent, dependent
and control variables
sela1:ed and the source of
infonnation
Variables

Acronym

Operationalisation

Proportion of lNED to toml number
directors on the board
Dichotomous: 1 with role duality
DUAL
and 0 if no role duality
The average munber of additional
XDill.
directorships of other i\1nlaysian
PLCs held by the lNED.lt is a proxy
for director calibre in the external
labour market
Insider
lNSlDER Percenmge of shares retained by
ownership
inside owners (namely shares isslIed
to management and dirators)
Foreign
FOREIGN Proportion of shares owned by
ownership
foreign shareholder to Total shares
outstanding
Smtutory audit fees divided by
Audit quality AUDIT
amount of sales
Debt to
DEBT
This is equal to long term debts
assets
divided by total assets. It is a proxy
for debt·f.nancir~
Timeliness
TlIVlELNS Nlunber of calendar days taken by
the company to publish its annual
report after fiscal year end
The corporate governance reporting
Disc!ostrre
DlSC
score
Tobin's q
QRATIO lVlarket value of ordinary shares
plus toml b(x)k value of long-term
debts divided by net worth (toml
assets less total liabilities)
Company
Total asset figw'es are the p!"Oxies
for company's size
size
Board
composition
No role
duality
Quality of
directors

lNED

Source of infonnation
Company annual reports for
financial year ending 2002
Company annual reportc; for
fmancial year ending 2002
Company annual reports for
financial year ending 2002

J3lVill's online company database,
retrieved from www.kLc;e-ris.com.
my
Investors digest Uune 200~) which
shows foreign shareholding as at
~lst December 2002
Company aml',lal \'epOlt f.)r financial
year ending 2002
Company anmml rept).-t. for iin.ancial
year ending 2002
J3MJ3's website
(www.bllrsarnalaysia.com)
Cornpal~}' anmlal ,eport ior financial
year ending 2002
C(lmpany allnual rep<>rt for fjru1.ncial
year ending 2002

Company annual \'epolt for financial
year ending 2002

Measurements
In addition to the explanation on the operationalisation given in Table I for each
variable, these are the variables that require further explanation:

Economic jmJjit
In Hils study) simi ];-1Y to Lee (2003), economic profit integrates iJu-ee aspeds of business
economics that (rrate shareholder value, namely, nrt operating profit after ta..x
(NOPAT), inveo,ied capital OC) and cost of capital. The NOPAT figures used were
basically earnings before interest, tax and amortization (EBlTA), less adjusted taxes.
To compute the Ie of a company, an average of its financial year 2001 closing book
values of total debt and total equity and its financial year 2002 book values of total
debt and total equity was used. The cost of capital is calculated based on its specific
weighted average cost of capital, which, in tum, is derived using the weight each
company has in terms of its market values of debt and equity. According to the
publishers of the business newsletter - The Edge, to calculate weighted average cost of
capital in 2002 the risk free rate used was 3.5 per cent, and the average risk premium
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added to obtain the expected market rate of return was around 4.5 per cent. The key
n1f.'lsure by which the companies were ranked in this study was economic profit (or
residual income), which is EBITA less weighted average cost of capital of Ie. Lee (2003)
emphasized that "EPIIC" is used because it would remove the distortion caused by the
difference in company size and could be used to rank companies ba~-ed on economic
profit.s.

Audit quality
Even though there are various factors studied that represent audit quality, it seems
tb~lt the most commonly studied fartor related to audit qual ity is audit finn si7R.
Previous studies document that Big Four (or their precursor:-;) auditor:-; charge higher
audit fees, spend more time on audits, and have fewer lawsuits than non·Big Four
auditors, implying that Big Four auditor:-; provide higher quality audits than non-Big
Four auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and Simon, 1987; Palmro,se, 1988, 1989). Even
after control1ing audit risk, client size and audit complexity, there is an additional
premium based on auditor identity (Wooten, 2(03). Based on the arguments that audit
fee can also reflect the level of audit quality (as argued by Shapiro: 1983; Ferguson et al,
2005; Venkataraman et al., 2(05) and that there is a positive association between audit
firm size and audit fee, this simiy excludes audit firm size fTom the correlation and
regression analysis. Instead, similar to Che Haat et aL's (2005) study on Malaysian PN4
companies[l], the ratio of audit fee to R.M100 of sales is used, as the data is continuous
and is expected to provide more robust results compared to the dununy variable used
for audit firm size.
Dz~~closure

index
The disclosure index reporting model developed in the current research is based upon
fadors identified in national and intem~itional best practice guidelines and other
research studies[2]. The model considers objec1ive factor:-; based on publicly disclosed
information. Corporate governance factors are generally divided into two main
categories: basic corporate governance variables are those items specifically identified
by the Code, and quality corporate governance variables are value-added items
generally proposed by other best prac1ices worldwide. It is important to note that the
ultimate objec1ive of this corporate governance rating exercise is to encourage the
firms to uphold the "substance over [am:" princip Ie of govern;mce rather than merely a
"box-ticking" process of compliance with statutory regulation.
In this study, unlike the self-assessment questionnaire designed by the Forum for
Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2003), and the voluntary disclosure index by
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), and the corporate governance questionnaire used in
Saldana's (2000) study (which only provided a dichotomous scale of a "yes" or "no"
options), the checklist is designed so that every individual disclosure is evaluated
based on a five point of Likert scale. We IDf..Clsured the level of corporate govemance
reporting based on the extent to which companies disclose the relevant information in
their annual reports. The list classifies the contextual factors into eight major groups
that simultaneously emphasize the prac1icability and world-class quality of reporting
goals. However, to keep our disclosure index comparable to those used in prior studies,
we focused only on the accountability and transparency measures, which include both
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voluntary and mandatory disclosure requirements that are accounting related
(Appendix).

Thnelines.\'
BMB's latest Revamped Listing Requirements (January 2(01), paragraph 9.23, requires
listed companies to submit the annual repons within a period not exceeding 6 months
from the close of the fiilll.ncial year of the listed issuer. In addition, companies are also
required to submit the interim repons, i.e. qua11erly repon not later than two months
after the end of each quarter of the financial yc.:'U'.
For the purpose of this study, the date of the submis."ion of the annual repon is the
reponing event used. Similar to the operationalisation used by Syed Ahmad and
Mohd Zaini (2003), the annual repon submission date is selected because of the
imponant role played by the company's repon as a valuable communication tool to
users of the infonnation, and the fal'1: that the release of the annual repons are
imponant events as required under the Companies Act (1965) and guidelines issued by
the semrity Commission and the KLSE. Thus, timelines." is measured in tenns of the
time interval (in number of caJendar days) between the ftscaJ year-end and the elate of
announcement of the annual repon submis...,ion made to BMB.

Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q is used in this study as a proxy for market rerum. Tobin's Q compares the
market value of the tlrm ,vith the replacement cost of the finn's assets. It also implies
that the greater the real rerum on investment, the greater the value of Q. The
methodology used to calculate Tobin's Q is based on Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Lang
et al (1989) and Vogt (1994)- The firm's market value is rrw.asured by the market value
of ordinary shares plus the market value of long-tenn bonds and the book value of
preference shares. The market value of the ordinary shares is estimated by multiplying
the number of ordinary shares by the share price at the end of the fiscal year, while the
debt value of alll,lmpanies L.<; equal to the total book value of all long-term debt. The
market value of debt could not be obtained because all these companies had obtained
private loans, for which information was not available. Similar to Weir et al (2002), the
denominator was measured as net worth which is total assets less total liabilities. The
total assets and liabilities were detennined from the annual repons.
Stati~tical {malys1s

All the data were analysed using the statistical package for social science (SPS..S)
version 12.0. Based on the above discussion, independent variables comprise the
percentage of independent non-exemtive directors (INED) on the board, average
number of cross-directorship among INED, role duality, insider ownership, foreign
ownership, debt-to-asset ratio and audit quality. The level of disclosure and timely
reporting are the variables that repre."ent transparency. The dependen t variable is also
represented by Tobin's Q as a measure of market perfonnance. Furthermore, multiple
regression models (based on three dependent variables - Tobin's Q, Attribute 5 of a;
Reporting Score (disclosure) and timeliness) are used to determine which of the
hypothesised explanatory variables affect the likelihood of a finn in a'eating good
performance, and whether corporate governance mechanisms affel'1: the level of
disclosure and timeliness of reporting.
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Results
The data analysis is to test whether corporate governance mechanisms are significant
predic1:ors of market performance, and whether the level of transparency is a
signific;mt predictor in the relationship ben.vf-en corporate governance variables and
market performance. In brief, Hi to H3 states that corporate governance mechanisms
lead to higher market performance, while H4 to H6 state that corporate governance
mechanisms lead to higher level of transparency.
Multiple regression was used to test all the hypotheses which are related to
corporate governance anributes, disclosure, timeliness and market performance.
Several assumptions in regre...,sion analysis have been tested to ensure that there is no
significant multicollinearity between the independent variables; that the variance of
the distribution of the dependent variable is the same for all value.'> of independent
variables (homocedastic1ty); that a linear relationship exists between dependent and
independent variables (linearity); that the distribution of values of the dependent
variable for each value of the independent variable is normal (normality) and that no
errors related to measurement and specification exL.<;t Nlulticollillearity was tested
based on the correlation matrix. According to Pallant (2001), multicollinearity exists
when the independent variables are highly correlated (r = 0.9 and above). The results
of the test: indicate that all thp correlation coefficients between the independent
variables are Ie:>.'> than 0.9. An analysis of residuals, plots of the studentised residuals
against predicted values is conduc1:ed to te."t for homocedastic1ty, linearity and
normality assumptions. As recommended by Pallant (2001), observations with
studentised residuals of more than 3.00 are omined from the analysis. Furthermore,
normality tests based on skewness, kurtosis and Ko!mogorov-Smimov or K-S.
Lilliefors were also conduc1:ed. Transformation is undertaken for both independent and
dependent variables when it doe." not meet the assumptions of normality. For example,
Tobin's Q, total assets, average number of cross-directorship held by INED,
percentage of foreign ownership are transformed into Log while fiml age was
transformed into square root The selection of method of transformation is based on the
shape of distribution depiC1:ed by histogram, as suggested by Tabachnik and Fidell
(1996).
The data were analysed by multiple regression using seven different independent
variables (which are grouped into three categories) on 142 companies. The first
category is the internal governance factors consisting of four variables namely
composition of INED on board, no role duality, quality of directors and insider
mvnershjp. The semncl category is ownership structure/financing factors which
comprising of foreign QVvnership and debt financing. The third category contains the
variable of audit quality that represents an external governance mechanism. The initial
sample consisted of 146 companies, however, for the purpose of regression analysis,
four companies with extreme Tobin's Q were omitted from the analysis, thus making
up 142. Four separate regression models were run, Tables II-V, panel.., A, B, C and D,
individually summarise the regression results.
Table II (panel A) demonstrates the regression results for the relationship between
the corporate governance factors and market performance (measured by Tobin's Q).
The regression produced an adjusted R 2 of 0.392. The results show that company's
economic profit (a.." published by Lee, 2003) ha.." a significant positive influence over
market performance. Three corporate governance variables were found to be
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Table n.
Panel A: hierarchical regressions: results of
prediction between internal corporate
governance mechanisms, ownership/financing
factors and audit quality on Tobin's Q

Variables
Constant
Finn age
Emt:omic ;),olit
Size
.

Model 1
0.016 (0.26.9)
- 0.014 (- 0.812)
0.:n4 ,,'," (5.814)
- 0.007 (- 0.129)

r-.'1odeI2

Model 1

- 0.114 (- 0567)

0.11Z""" (i604)
- 0.009 (- 0.171)

- 0.600 (- 2.10:))
0.000 (0.009)
0.122 " ,. ,. (6,:)42)
- 0.001 (- 0.101)

0.207 (0.719)
0.017 (0.471)
O.01Z (0.115)
0.001 (0.769)

0.044 (0.178)
0.008 (O.llZ)
- 0.024 (- 0.264)
0.001 (0.871)

0.481
O.Oll
0.211
0.189
0.444
7, no

0.027" (1.76;"))
0.6.% ,,"" (6.210)
- 0.088"" (- Z586)
0.661
0.206
0.417
0.192
15.1:i7"" ,.
10,127

- o.on (- 0.751)

iVlain effects
Internal mechanisms
lNED
Cross·diret-1:orship
No role duality
lnsider
(lwnershipHinal,cil1g
Fore~~

Debt·to·asset
Audit quality
N
Change in R 2
N2
Adj. R i.'
I'~statistic chang'e
I)f

0.470
0.221
0.221
0.201
1Z.;)41 "**
1,1:14

Notes: 1. log_QRAT10 = u: + {31 sqrCAGE + (3Z EconP + f31Iog_A5.SET + ~;; 2. IO!LQRAI10
(X + 131 sqrcAGE + fJZ EconP + 131 log_ASSET + f34 lNED +; /fi logJ(l)lR + il6 ROLEDLJAL
+ f37lNSIDER +~;;1.log_QRAT10 = u: + 131 sqrt_AGE +f3ZEconP+ j31log_A..SSET + j34lNED+;
f3:") logYDlR + il6 ROLEDLJAL + /37 lNSIDER + /38IogjORElGN + ffJ DEilT + 1310 ALJDlT + ~;;
perfonnance is measmed by Tobin's {J;N = 14Z; "sigl1mcar.t at the 0.10 level; ,,', significant at the 0.05
le\'el; ,,', "signmcant at the O.0llevel

=

signifiGUlt foreign oWTlershjp, debt: -to asset and audit quality (significant at ] 0 per cent,
1 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively). All the internal governance mechanisms in the
analysis do not have significant influence on firm pedonr~ance. In addition, the
significant relation bt:'tween debtto-asst:'t and performance also indicates that market
is more confident with the monitoring by finns' creditors. The significant positive
relation between foreign ownership and performance is consistent with theory
suggesting that foreign investor ownership is positively associated with good
perfonnance companies. The results also support the research that shows that the
presence of foreign investors in a firm arc associated with higher profitability (Smith
et at, 1997; Claessens and Djankov, 1999) as weU as greater efJiciency resulting irorn
higher managerial talent, access to advanced technology, and entry into more lucrative
products and capital markets (D'Souza et al, 2(01).
Table IT (panel A) also shmvs that there is significant negative relation between
aud it fee and fmn pedorrnance, which means that poor perfommncefirrns pay
relatively higher audit fees when compared to good perf0I111anCe finns. This suggests
that poor performance finns rely on higher audit services to improve their
perfonnance. This could be because audit quality is an import;mt factor influencing the
business conduct of poorly managed companies which in turn improves their
performances. Overall, the significant Fstatistic change in Model 3, Table II (panel A)
indicates that there 1.,-; evidence to support H2 that states higher foreign ownership and
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Table m.
Panel B): hierarchical regressions: results of
prediction between internal corporate governance mechanisms,
ownership/financing factors and audit quality
on disclosure

Variables

Modell

Model 2

Model J

C()n~tant

41.679""" (19.406)
- 0.J91 (- L419)
-0.4;)6 (-0517)
0.600""" (1.7JJ)

J7.JOJ ",." (11519)
- 0.404 (- L417)
- 0.07;) (- 0.084)
0.7;');) ,,,. (2.099)

J7.1JO" ,.• (7.770)
- 0.467 (- L;)(}.'))
- 0.2:');') (-0.274)
0.810" (Ln7)

10J66 • ,. (2.2:>8)
- L6]) (- 1.28.1)
0.216 (OJJO)
0.007 (0.J46)

11.1;)9 *" (2.409)
- L667 (- 1.288)
0.;)40 (0.J18)
0.007 (0.:146)

0.2:')9
0.041
0.067
0.019
L490
7,n')

OJ6J (0_;)70)
- L928 (- 0.9JO)
- 0.002 (- O.OOJ)
0.27;)
0.009
0.076
O.om
O.40J
10,1:12

Firm age
Economic profit
Size
Main ejjeds
Internal mechanisms
lNED
Cross-directorship
No role duality
Insider
()wlle.shipifn3ncin,l';
Foreign
Debt-to-asset
Audit quality
N.
Change in N. 2
N.;:
Adj. N.:<
Fstati~tic change
Of

OJ61
0.026
0.026
O.om
1.281
J,1:19

Notes: L DISG = a + f31 sqrt_AGE + ~2 EconP + (3J log_AS-.SCr + f:; 2. DlSG = cr + f31
sqrtjGE + [r2 EconP + I-n log_ASSET + f34 INED + f3;') jog_XDIR +; 136 ROLEDlJAL + f37
INSiDER + f;; J. DlSG = a + 131 sqrt_AGE + f32 EconP + 13J log_AS-.SET + 134 INED + f3;,)
log_XDlR +; ll6 ROLEDlJAL + f37 lNSlDER + 138 log_FOREIGN + f39 DEllT + f310 AlJDlT + f;;
dischmre level in this regression is measmed by the score for Attribute;) of CG Rep,)rting Score while
performance measme used is Tobin's 0, N = 142; "sigl1mcant at the 0.:0 level; "'·si.gnificant at the
o.m leve~ ,,', "signific:ar.t at the o.m level

higher debt financing lead to significant higher fum performance. However, the results
suggests that there is no support for HI and H3, which state that stronger internal
governance mechanisms lead to significant higher fim1 perionnance, and higher audit
quality leads to significant higher fim1 perfonnance.
Table III (panel B) depicts the second regression re..-:ults, which serve to examine the
as..,-;ociation between corporate governance factors and disclosure. The regression
produced an adjusted R 2 of only 0.005. This table shows that all the selected corporate
governance factors do not signific..1.ntly predict the level of disclosme.
Table IV (panel C) shows the third regression results for the relationship between the
corporate governance factors and timeliness of reporting. The table shows that the
adjusted R 2 is 0.008 and only intemal govemanee mechanisms significantly contribute
to higher market perfonnance. The implementation of split roles of Chairman and CEO
shows a marginaIly si,s'Djficant associa bon with timeliness (at 10 per cent level). Looking
at the coefficient, lhe table shows that there is a negative relationship between I:\"ED
and timelines..-:. As timeline..-:s is measured by number of days taken for a company to
publish its annual report, the negative sign means that companies with split roles take
les..,-; time to publish their annual rep<.1l1s, therefore, there is a positive association
between no role duality and timeliness. However, both Tables III (panel B) and IV
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Table IV.
Panel C: hierarchical regressions: results of
prediction between internal corporate
governance mechanisms,ownership\financing
factors and audit quality on timeliness

Variables
Com,tant
Finn age
Economic profit
Size
f\t!ain effects
Internal mechanisms
lNED
Cross·dira:ton;hip
No role duality
Insider
(lwnershipliilliJI'cil,g

Modell

I\lode12

Model 3

- 3.977 (- 0.072)
4.2L1 (059:»
22.299 (0.984)
- 6.525 (- 0.733)

- 24.262 (- 0.294)
4.112 (056:»

- 109.384 (- 0.899)
6.714 (0.850)
24.08-1 (1.016)
- 0.870 (- 0.073)

19.794 (0.$1)

- 6.3;)6 (- 0.693)
1ll.215 (0.969)
42.243 (1.299)
- 73.440 ,. (- 1.732)
0.768 (1523)

39.3ll (1.192)
- 77.46.1 * (- 1.789)
0.731 (1.416)

Fore~gn

Debt·to·asset
Audit quality
N
lnange in N 2
N2
Adj. N;Fstatistic change

Df

100.041 (0.R4R)

0.102
0.010
0.010
- 0.01l
0.479

0.2:)9

- 1.797 (- 0.247)
4,1543 (0,82;))
- 1;;'788 (- 0.990)
0.279

0.057

0.011

0.067
O.OlR
2.m.l *

0.07R
0.008
052;)

3,13.9

7,13:>

10,132

Notes: 1. IOjLTIME = a + {31 sqrCAGE + f32 EconP + 133 log_As..C:;LT + f;; 2. IOjLTlIVlE
+ {31 sQrt_AGE + f32 EconP + f33 lOiLASSET + ,B4 lNED + Wi !ojLXDJR +; 136 ROLEDLJAL
+ I'll lNSIDER + f;; 3. IO~LTlI\'lE = IX + ,Bl sQrt_AGE + 132 EconP + f3.1 !ofLAs..C:;ET + f34 lNED
+ fJ5 IO~LXDJR + 136 ROLEDLJAL + f37 lNSIDER + f38lo~U'OREIGN + f39 DE13T + f3l0 ALJDfr + f;;
~rfonnance memmre used in ~~,i~ regression is Tobin's Q; N = 142; "significant at the O.LO level
slgmficant at the O.O'J level;' significant at the 0.01 level

= a

(panel C) indicate that corporate governance mechanisms do not seem to predic1 higher
level of transparency and therefore, there is no support for H4, H5 and H6 which,
respectively, state that stronger intemal govemance mechanisms lead to significant
higher level of corporate transparency; higher foreign ownership and higher debt
financing lead to si.!,1J1iflcant hight'T level of corporate transparency; and, higher audit
quality leads to significant higher cOl1Jorate transparency.
Furthermore, H7a states that when corporate governance mechanisms are strong,
transparency is increased, and in turn, the increased transparency could lead to higher
performance as stated by H7b. Table V (panel D) demonstrates the relations between
all the corporate governance fac1ofS, disclosure and timeliness regressed against
company performance. It was found in the regression for the fourth model that the
inclusion of disclosure and timeliness into the regression only contributed marginally
to change to R 2. The fourth model also shows that its F-statistic change is
not signific..1.nt which mea.ns that the inclusion of disclosure and timeliness does not
significantly contribute to better firm peliorn:ance. This mea.ns that there is no support
for H7a and H7b either.
Based on the four regressions, the overall results can be summarised in Figure l.
The diagram in Figure 1 shows that for Ix)th disclosure and timeliness variables,
corporate governance fac10rs do not predict the level of disclosure and timeliness
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Table V.
Panel D: hierarchical regressions: results of
prediction between internal corporate
governance mechanisms,ownership\financing
factors, audit quality,disclosure and timeliness
on Tobin's Q
Variables

lVlodel1

Constant
Finn age

0.036 (0.26.9)
-0.014 (-0.832)
0.:514 "','.' (5.814)
- 0.007 (- 0.329)

Economic profit
Size
IVlain effects
Jnternal mechanisms
lNED
Cross-dira:torship
No role duality
Jnsider

rVlode12

Mndel3

- 0.114 (- 0.567) - 0.600 ".' (- 2.:mii)
- O.OB (- 0.751)
0.000 (0.009)
0.312 " ,," (5.604) 0.322"""' (6,:>42)
- 0.009 (- 0.371) - 0.003 (- 0.101)
0.207 (0.739)
0.m7 (0.471)
0.032 (0.315)
0.001 (0.769)

0.044 (0.178)
0.008 (0.112)
- 0.024 (- 0.264)
O.lJ01 (0.871)

1\1odel 4
- 0.714 .'* (- 2.274)
o.om (0.167)
0.329 " .'" (6.6.19)
- 0.006 (- 0.229)
0.039 (0.155)
0.022 (0.3B)
- 0.042 (- 0.465)
0.001 (0.9:i5)

OwnershipifEancing
Fore(~

0.027* (1.76:»
0.027"' (1.740)
0.69:i ""* (6.210)
0.708""" (6.293)
- 0.088" * (- 25M) - 0.091 *"" (- 2.675)
0.003 (0.:>41)
0.000 (- 1.2:>1)
0.661
0.667
0.206
0.008
0.437
0.445
0.392
0.391
15.357""·"
0.840
10,127
12,125

Debt-to-asset
Audit quality
Disclos1.lfe
Timeline;s
I(

Change in 1(2
I( ?

Adj. I(?
Fstatistic change
ill

0.470
0.221
0.221
0.203
12.:>41 ,,"',
3,134

0.481
0.011
o.:m
0.189
0.444
7, BO

Notes: 1. log_QRA'no = a +.81 sqrt_AGE +f32 EconP +lnlog_As..C;ET +f;; 2. lO/LQRAI10
= a + 131 sqrt_AGE + {J2 EconP +
log_As..C;ET + J34 lNED + {3;> log_XD!R + 136 l{OLEDlJAL
+ ffl lNSJDlli + f; 3; log_QRATJO = (t + {31 sqrt_AGE + {12 EconP + f3,11og_As..C;ET + {34 lNED
+ 135 IO~LXD!R + 136 l{OLEDUAL + (37 lNSJDlli + /38 lO/LFOH.EIGN + (39 DEBT + /310 AlJDff
+ f:; 4. lOILQRATJO = a + [31 sqrcAGE + {32 EconP + /331n/LAs..C;ET + {34 lNED + /35 lO/LXD!R
+ 136 l{OLEDlJAL + {37 JNSIDEl{ + f38 log_FOruGN + fJ9 DWT + f310 AUDJT + /311 OlSG +
(312 log_'l1ME + f:; N = 142; "signif-icanl al the 0.10 level; ""sigl1ii1(:a.nt at the 0.05 I<,vel;
.,.' "sigl\ificaEt at the 0.01. it'vd

rn
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Figure 1.
The sumarized results
from four hierarchical
regressions
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of repolling. Instead, the direct relationship between corporate governance factors and
pelformance is statistically significam.
From this analysis, the overall results indicate that practising good corporate
governance is an important factor that influences fmn market performance (me.asw-ed
by Tobin's Q). This is shown by the adjusted R~! of 0.392 in the t1rst regression model,
which indicates that 39.2 per cent of the variation in Malaysian listed companie..<; l'-;
explained by the independent variables. The two major contributing factors that
significantly influence firnl Inarket perforn131Ke are debt. financing and foreign
ownership. However, there is a s~gnificant negative association between audit quality
and performance, \villi poor firms using more audit: services than good firms.

Testing the robustness of anlllYS1~' - sjJ/:it dala analysis
In order to test the robustness of the earlier regression analysis, the data is regressed
again but at this stage the companie..,-; are split into good and poor performance based on
the matched pair basis introduced earlier. The results are shown in Tables VI (panel E)
up to IX (panel II). Table 'VI (panel E) Model 2 shows that., consistent with the findings
from the earlier regression analysis, the effecl of internal governance mechanisms on
both the good and poor perfonnance companies is insignificant. This gives an
indica tion that the market does not value internal governance mechanisms
implemented within the companies. It might also highlight the way companies
respond towards the Code's recommendations, which is possibly more w "box-ticking"
rather than taking the "substance" of it. In addition, the neg-ative association of audit
quality and performance is stronger to the good performance companies illustrated in
Model 3, Table VI (panel E) where the coefficient tor audit quality is - 0.080 (significant
at 10 per cent level) and -0.082, respectively, and 0.570 and 0.756 (both are signiflcani
at 1 per cent level), respeclively, for debt-wasset. This implies that good do not consider
high quality audit service as an important governance mechanism w anain higher
performance, although the companies with relatively poorer performance consider
external audits (similar to the findings from Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; Che Haat
et al, 2(05) and debt financing as an effective tool to bring back their companies to
better performance.
Moreover, when disclosure and timeliness are included in the regression against
market performance (Table VJ] (panel F)), F-statistic change again does not show a
s~gnificant outcome which means that corporate transparency is not the main concern
of the market in assessing fim1 perforn1alKe. To examine whether the effect of
corporate governance mechanism to disclosure and timeliness is different between the
good and poor performance companies, the results in Tables vm (panel G) and IX
(panel H) reveal that there is no evidence showing that corporate governance
mechanisms have a significant dfed on disclosure and timeliness for both good and
poor performance companies. This might indicate that there is ab.'o an "expeclation
gap" between the contents of annual reports presented by Malaysian companies and
the way the market uses the information found in the annual reports. Perhaps, annual
reports are seen to be les..,-; effeclive in conveying useful information to the users or that
the users consider other sources of information about the companies as more reliable
and trusted. The other pos.."ibility is that investors in Malaysia may not refer to
fundamental corporate information as a basis in making their investment decisions,
and instead tend to be influenced by speculations in doing w.
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Table VI. Panel E: hierarchal regressions: results of prediction between
internal corporate government mechanisms, ownership/financing factors,
audit quality on Tobin's Q, within both good and poor companies
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Table VII. Panel F: hierarchical regressions: results of prediction between
internal corporate governance mechanisms, ownership/financing factors and audit
quality on disclosure, within both good and poor companies
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Table VIII. Panel G: hierarchical regressions: results of prediction between
internal corporate governance mechanisms, ownership/financing factors on the
audit quality on timeliness, within good and poor companies
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In other words, the results from the split data regres..<.;ion analysis are consistent with
the main analysis mentioned earlier. Apart from supporting the results provided by the
main analysis, it also reveals further u....,eful results, for example showing that the effect
of corporate governance in forms of high audit quality and monitoring by creditors
through debt financing are stronger to the poor perforn,ance companies as compared to
good performance companies.

Discussion
In view of the emphasis by the Malaysian government on good corporate governance
practices, the role of this study is to explore the fac'tors that cause poor pertormance
companies to destroy value instead of creating value for their shareholders. In
particular, this study investigates how the corporate governance mechanisms
including weak disclosures, poor timeliness of reporting and poor debt management
may have raised "red flags" to the stakeholders, bringing about intense scrutiny that
could help reduce the agency costs to debt holders and equity holders. In order to make
a comparison, using a sample of 73 good performance companies based on shareholder
value creation (Lee, 2(03), and 73 comparable poor performance companies over the
year 2002, this stlldy invf'Stigates the governance mechanisms, financing strategies,
audit quality, disclosures and timeliness which may determine the good from the poor
pertormance companies.
This study anempts to examine the effet.1: of internal governance mechanisms,
financing factors/ownership structure and audit quality on disclosure, timeliness and
company performance. The estimated equations based on the 142 sample companies
strongly indic..'1.te that corporate governance matters for the performance of firms in the
market, even though the internal governance mechanisms do not have a strong
influence on company periorrnance. The results show that debt-w·asst't and audit
quality have a significant influence over the finl1's market performance. This suggests
that the external audits serve as an important governance mechanism for creditors,
paliicularly to ensure that poor per[onnance finns with high level of debt practise good
debt management which ultin1ately helps them improve their financial condition. 'This
is similar to the findings made by Mohammed et al (2006). The signific..'1.nt relation of
debt-to-asset to pertormance supports the theory that debt is an important mechanism
for solving agency problems in corporations charac'terised by the separation of
ownership and control in Malaysia (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Stulz,
1990; Hart and Moore, 1995).
However, when the corporate governance variables are regressed against the
level of disclosure and timeliness of reporting, the results indicate that corporate
governance mechanisms do not influence disclosure and timeliness of reporting.
Moreover, when disclosure and timelines...., are included in the regres....,ion against
market performance, the results do not show a significant relationship. This means
that transparency is not the main concern of the marl(et in rJ...-;sessing finn
pertormance. Therefore, this study does not provide evidence to show the
relationship that corporate governance mechanisms lead to greater corporate
transparency and there is also no evidence that transparency contributes to better
film perfonnance.
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Conclusion
The possible reason for "ineffectiveness" of other reported internal governance
mechanisms in differentiating the performance of companies is due to the effect of the
MCCG. The Code was introduced and became effective in 2001, almost one year before
the cut off date of the data used in this study. As a result, this study fails to provide
evidence that internal governance mechanisms may contribute to bener company
perfonnance because most companies probably has implemented the recommendations
of the Code (as suggested by Eow et al., 2003). Tht'refore, thert' is no significant diHt'rence
between good and poor performance companies insofar as internal governance is
concerned. This is contrary to tl1t' findings of Leng and J\lansor (2005) and Abdul
Rahman and Haniffa (2003) who found that internal governance such as role duality has
a positive effect on performance. This could also be because of the difference in the
measurement used to represent perfonnance in this study. Unlike their studies which
use purely accounting perfonnance (ROE as the variable), this study uses economic
profit (represt'nting tht' level of shareholdt'r value creAtion) suggested by Lee (2003).
In addition, this study introduces variables of disclosure and timeliness in its
resp.arch LTamework in order to dt'tennine whether rnarkt't pt'rtonnance is influenced
by the level of corporate transparency. Therefore, one of the contributions of this
study is to examine whether higher market performance is also due to greater
transparency resulting from good governance practice. The insignificant effect of
transparency indicates that, in contrary to the theoretical argument by Loh (2002) who
suggests that corporate governance may impact transparency and consequently lead
to better market perfoilllanCe, this study reveals that tram;parency is not a significant
factor that determines the relationship between corporate governance factors and the
market perfonnance of a company.
Tht' findings from this study show that tl1t're is no relationship between tht' level of
disclosure and market performance, might lead to the question of disclosure
framework in Malaysia. The problem with the framework could be due to investors
still being unable to have equal access to disclosed infonnation, or that some investors
might have had the infonnation earlier than the others. In addition, the contents of the
infonnation disclosed might have not catered to the needs of investors. There might
also be certain fundamental information that is lacking in the Malaysian disclosure
framework. In their criticisms pertaining to this matter, Standard and Poors (2004)
revealed that most of the companies in Malaysia still fell short of global disclosure
practice (Standard and POOfS, 2004; Toll, 2(04), and the current study reinforces their
point of view. In other words, there is still inadequate disclosure on corporate
governance practices which is mandatory under the Bursa Malaysia Listing
Requirements, let alone other voluntary infonnation such as business ethics and
responsibility, intellectual capital, reviews of vision, mission and goal statements, as
mentioned in this study.
In short, corporate governance does matter to Malaysian listed companies, even
though monitoring through internal mechanisms seem"> to be relatively ineffective.
The contribution of this study is that it shows the importance of good corporate
governance mechanisms for debt holders and minority shareholders in emerging
markets. Stakeholders can phy a role in reducing agency cost by monitoring "red flags"
of weak corporate governance mechanism.." for example, poor debt management and
low audit quality.
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hnplications of the study
The i~sue of tran~parency (in which di~closure and timely reporting are part of) is with
regard to the perception of the stakeholders towards the usefulness of annual reports
and other sources of information about companies. The findings from this study show
that there is no relationship between corporate governance factors and transparen t:y,
and there is also no relationship between transparenc...)' and company performance.
This might indicate that there is an "expectation gap" between the contents of annual
reports pre;ented by Malaysian companies and the way the investors use the
information found in the annual reports for their inve;unent decisions. Perhaps, annual
reports are seen to be less effective in conveying useful information to the users due to
the disclosure of information that is no longer relevant to them, or that current users
demand more £rom the contents of annual reports. The Other possibility is that it might
be due to the users who consider other source; of information about the companies as
more reliable, tmsted and easily accessible relative to the film's annual reporl<;. The
fact that investors do not rely on annual reports to make financial decisions may
worsen the problem of "information asynunetry", since insiders may take advantage of
having access to internal information. Thus, it is important for the regulators such as
the SC or BMB to educate the investors, so that they will be able to look at the
fundamentals of a company rather than solely rely on speculation in making
inve;tment decisions.
This study also highlights foreign O'A-11ership as one of the most signific.."lnt
predic...'tors to market perfoffi1ance. This indicate; that foreign investors have an
influential role in aJiecling the performance of companies part.iOlhlIly becauSC' of their
better skills in selec...'ting good companies to invest in. When compared to local
inve;tors, foreign investors seem to be relatively more critical in making business
decisions and tend to look at the fundamentals of a company's governance and
performance. Therefore, there is a basis for the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia
(as quoted in the New Strait, Times on 26 July 2(04) calling local inve;tors to take the
lead in investing in the country instead of merely following the foreign institutional
funds. The results also support the literature which shows that the presence of foreign
inVF-stors in a finn are associated \vith higher protitability (Smith et al., 1997; Claessens
and Djankov, 1999), forcing local tim:s to restructure especially on corporate
governance and technology faster (Yudaeva et aL, 2000), and higher efficiency resulted
from higher managerial talent, access to advanced technology, and entry into more
lucrative produc...'ts and capital markets (D'Souza el aL, 2(01).
With regard to auditing as a corporate governance mechanism, even though
lately there has been news that has put auditors under bad light, for example in the
case of Enron in the USA, as well as the AWA and lllH failures in Australia
(George and Malane, 2(04), this study indicate; that quality audit can play an
important role as an effective corporate governance mechanism in Malaysian
companies. Therefore, the regulators, as well as accounting profes.."ional bodie;,
should take steps to ensure that audit quality 1..., maintained, and that the
independence of extemal auditors is also preserved. This will be reflected in
the reliable and credible audit report, which 1.." one of the sources of reference for the
users of accounts.
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Limitations of the study
The data covers only a one-year period, which is for the year 2002. The purpose of
using the 2002 data is in order to observe the effec'ts of the new Revamped KLSE
Listing Requirements which were introduced in 2001. The new listing requirements
require all listed companies to include in their annual reports a separate statement on
corporate governance. Unfortunately, the analysis of corporate disclosure in this study
could not be extended beyond the year 2002. This is due to the analysis of annual
reports in order to come out with the corporate governance reporting score which was
time-consuming, espel'ially in ensuring its reliability and consistency A researcher has
to spend between two to four hours to read and identify the information disclosed in
each annual report. The results could have been improved if the data were collected
from a period of longer than a ye..1.r, for example for a four or five-year period.
The findings of this study are only based on the data. for 2002. Future studies in (his
area might want to extend the scope of the data from only a one-year period to a few
years, so that one could have a better understanding of the issues of corporate
governance especially in an anempt to relate it to certain events, for example the
introduction of the MCCG in the year 2001 or the introduction of Best Practices in
Corpora te Disclosure by BMB in July 2004. Throughout the period of three years
between 2003 and 2005, there could be events, e..<;pecially those assol'iated with the
corporate governance reform agenda by the authorities (the SC and BMB), that might
have changed the landscape of corporate governance practices. This includes the
cessation of Practice Note 4 (PN4) by 31st December 2004 as well as the introduc'tion of
new Practice Note 17 (pNl7) to replace PN4.
Lastly, this paper deals only with "one-way" causality running from corporate
governance mechanisms to performance even though there is evidence of
"reverse-way" and "two-way" causality in governance literature.. However, given the
high insider ownership levels of insiders it is unlikely that the "reverse-way" causality
is present in Malaysia.
Notes
L PN4 is a classitication pursuant to tile BlVlB's Listing Requirement", whereby listed
cmnpanies are required to have an adequate level of tinanci,,j condition in order to warrant
conti.nued trading and listing' on the Of1icial List of the Exchange_ Starting .from 1 January
2CK)5, it was replaced by P;-.J17 which extends the criteria of P;-.J4. In this study, P;-.J4
companies are companies which failed to meet the criteria set out under the Bt\-ffi's "Practice
;-.Jote ;-.Jo. 04/2001". They are as follows:
• The company ttiled to reporr the deficit in its combined sl12reholders fnllds.
• Receivers or managers have been appointed to manage the asset of the relevant
companyliL<; subsidiaries properties!as.<;ociate companies.
• Auditors have given a "disclaimer opinion" regarding the companies outlook in the
company's latest account<;.
• A special manager has been appointed as provided for under the Danaharta ;-.Jasional
Berhad Management Act 1998.
2. These include OECD White Paper on Corporate (;ovemance in Asia (200,1); the IFAC
Credibility Report (2m3); Standard and Poors (2000); Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2001);
Blue Ribbon Comminee Report of USA (1999); Emst and Young's Report on Corporate
Govemance (2002); and the Malaysian Code of Corporate C;ovemance (20m).
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